In the aftermath of the Brexit, the EU is swinging between a vision of enhanced integration, depicted by the Five Presidents Report, and a decision by the people of one of its leading member states -the UK -to withdraw this alliance, that may be interpreted as a non-confidence vote in the enhanced integration process underlying the EU. This article assumes that non-democratic elements embodied in the measures taken to pull out of the financial crisis and stabilize EU/EMU economies may enhance non-confidence among EU/EMU citizens, serving as incentives for more member states to opt out of this alliance, inspired by the Brexit. While it might have been expected that as the peak of the crisis passed, decision makers would pay more attention to ensure the democratic nature of such measures, comparison of the regulation enacted during the emergency phase and shortly thereafter with later regulation reveals that, despite certain improvements, many non-democratic elements still characterize both the nature of the measures devised and the decision-making processes leading to them. The article suggests that the Brexit should serve as a red light, reinforcing previous criticism calling for improving the democratic nature of such measures and of the decision-making processes involved, to prevent a further drift.
Introduction
In June 2015 the Five Presidents Report 2 was published, suggesting that the way out of the financial crisis the EU/EMU has been experiencing since 2008 involves enhanced integration 3 leading, by 2025, to full economic, financial and fiscal unions, followed by a political union. Turning this vision into reality started a month later -in July 2015, without leaving much room for public discourse regarding this far-reaching plan.
A year later, in June 2016, UK citizens voted by referendum for withdrawing the EU. UK leaders decided to respect the majority's will. Thus, the UK is expected to be the first member state withdrawing the EU since its establishment. At this stage, it is unclear whether it will be the only withdrawing member state, or rather the Brexit may inspire other EU member states to follow.
The Brexit decision took place while the EU has been experiencing four simultaneous crises: the financial crisis, a refugees' crisis, a security crisis and a political crisis. These crises seem to turn the EU into a less attractive alliance than it used to be perceived by its population, bearing their costs. These crises reinforce former seeds of frustration, emanating, for a long time, from the 'democratic deficit' -the feeling that many relevant decisions accepted by EU institutions lack democratic legitimation, as the vast majority of EU citizens, and to a certain extent even their democratically elected representatives, are detached from EU decision-making processes. 4 One dilemma underlying this issue is that since the process of enhancing financial markets integration in the EU/EMU is highly technical, it is very difficult for most EU citizens to follow it closely. Moreover, the public is generally considered professionally unequipped to contribute to it. Consequently, by and large, decisions regarding this issue are taken by politicians, informed and guided by professional experts. At the same time, the decisions so taken substantially affect the daily lives of EU citizens. During the financial crisis, the Greek and Cypriot cases in particular seem to have highly raised the awareness of EU citizens to this fact, deterring countries like the Czech Republic and Poland 5 from joining the EMU. [Online]. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/economic-monetary-union/docs/5-presidents-report_en.pdf 3 The necessity for enhanced integration is further justified on grounds of global competitiveness, implying enhanced growth: PORTO, Manuel. The financial crisis highlighted yet another dilemma EU decision makers face with regard to the regulation of financial issues: flexible and more liberal financial and economic disciplines that existed before the crisis, which allowed more room for political maneuvering and sovereign governments choices, did not prove effective to prevent the crisis. Pursuing a more strictly disciplined regime that seems to be necessary to pull out of the current financial crisis and to prevent future ones involves further erosion of national discretion, in favor of enhanced EU intervention. 6 Non-satisfaction of the 'democratic deficit' underlying EU regime seems to have been one of the motivations behind the Brexit vote. 7 The UK was never an EMU member. Nevertheless, due to EU's high level of market integration, its economy was indirectly affected by the Euro crisis and by the decisions taken with regard to it. It is a well-known fact that the UK consistently fought for taking into consideration the implications any decision regarding financial regulation of the EMU may have on EU, non-EMU member states. 8 It is further assessed, that austerity served as a major motivation for UK's people voting in the referendum. 9 Other implications of EU financial crisis on the UK economy (e.g. on the banks, on housing prices etc.), and impressions gained from the Greek and Cypriot cases, widely covered by the global media, may have also affected this voting, at least indirectly. 10 6 JUNCKER, Jean Claude. Supra note 2, p. 7. National constitutional courts may play a decisive role in slowing down this process through interpretation that balances EU and national interests. See The Five Presidents Report explicitly admits that 'at the height of the crisis, far-reaching decisions had often to be taken in a rush, sometimes overnight. ' The report acknowledges that now, as the peak of the crisis is behind, 'is the time to review and consolidate our political construct' . 11 One would assume that in this spirit, and in light of the growing criticism, EU decision makers would strive now more determinately to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the decisionmaking process regarding the financial mechanisms devised to pull out of the crisis and stabilize the EMU, and the democratic nature of its fruits.
This article thus examines, through comparison of certain elements shared by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and the Singe Banking Supervision Mechanism (SSM), in the context of the Five Presidents Report's vision, whether the democratic nature of the legal instruments decided at EU level, and the decision-making processes leading to them, improved over time in terms of their democratic nature. For this assumption to prove correct, measures enacted later would bear more democratic (or less non-democratic) elements than measures enacted in time-proximity to the height of the crisis. It is acknowledged that the compared mechanisms are different in essence: the ESM is an emergency financial assistance mechanism. The SSM is a surveillance and preventive mechanism, including certain elements of enforcement. Nevertheless, the two mechanisms form parts of a broader system and vision (specified by the Five Presidents Report), thus being underlined by similar perceptions, and sharing certain common characteristics, on which this article would focus.
The Democratic Deficit and the Financial Crisis
Democracy is recognized by EU Treaties as a core value, underlying the EU alliance (Article 3(1) Treaty on the European Union (TEU), Article 9 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU)). 12 However, it seems to be widely recognized that due to EU's non-majoritarian structure, democracy at EU level cannot be obtained by patterns similar to national, majoritarian models. 13 15 At the same time, certain commentators suggest that representation and democracy are ensured by the EU architecture, only through a different, non-majoritarian model. 16 Notwithstanding the formal explanations, definitions or structure, the literature reflects the constant anticipation of EU citizens towards substantive enhancement of EU regime's democratic nature and legitimacy. Common consent with regard to the development and functioning of this alliance seems to be inevitable to its existence and future.
National regimes considered to be democratic are divided 17 to formal, electoral democracies, i.e. political regimes which merely allow political competition and generally fair elections, and substantial, liberal democracies, i.e. regimes which in addition to these formal characteristics effectively protect their citizens' property rights, political rights and civil rights. By analogy, a similar distinction between the formal structure, dictating the decision-making process, and the essence of the decisions taken by it may apply to the EU. In terms of essence, EU Treaties encompassing EU supranational regime's obligations to protect citizens' rights and act to improve their welfare rightly underline EU citizens' anticipation for these obligations to be fully respected.
Since democracy is broadly perceived as the 'government of the people, by the people [and] for the people' , 18 the literature explored whether EU citizens form a 'People' 19 or 'Peoples' , 20 sharing common values and interests. As the replies given to this question are varied and controversial, it is alternatively suggested that the underlying motivation for EU citizens to act together may be the enhancement of common, ad hoc, interests. 22 argue that electoral democracy marks a bargain between the propertied elite, interested in protecting its own (property) rights and little else, preferably by autocracy, and the mobilized masses forming the majority. According to this social bargain, the latter were accorded voting rights in return for their acceptance of the limits on their ability to expropriate property holders. By definition, EU supranational regime limits the direct access of the masses to the decision-making process, mainly exercised by elite groups, which, according to some, serve the interests of particular groups. 23 To a great extent, in the context of the financial crisis, the combination of this fact with the inherent conflict of interests and powers between the elite and the masses, reinforced EU citizens' -or 'people(s)' -frustration. In that sense, acts like the Brexit, the first vote of the Wallonian parliament of Belgium against the CETA in October 2016 (shortly later overturned by a political compromise) and even the vote of the Italian citizens in a national referendum that took place in December 2016 with regard to suggested modifications in the Italian constitution may be seen as attempts by the masses, or by their directly elected representatives, to preserve or regain their right to affect decision-making, according to that social, historic bargain, eroded by the gradual delegation of national sovereign powers to a supranational entity: the EU.
Those who see the EU as merely a mutant evolved by states' politicians, based on their notions of state governance, rather than as a unique phenomenon, 24 may perceive the 'democratic deficit' in the EU as only a symptom, reflecting the general failure of the party system, and a process of depoliticization, experienced by domestic politics of Western countries in general, or maybe even as part of a global 'democratic recession' . on the analogy with national institutions; majoritarian standards, concentrating mainly on the European Parliament's involvement in the decision making; standards derived from the democratic legitimacy of the member states, concentrating on the balance of powers in the Council of Ministers; and social standards, concentrating on aspects of equality and social justice of the decisions taken.
The broad literature criticizing the measures taken to pull out of the financial crisis 27 refers to all these aspects. It reveals failures to respect the democratic principles, both in terms of formal representation and in terms of the substance of the measures devised.
Financial Crisis Enhances Financial Integration
The financial crisis in the EU started in 2008. In 2010, two temporary assistance mechanisms were established: the EFSM (European Financial Stability Mechanism), 28 and EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility).
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In While the temporary instruments devised were limited to emergency financial assistance, the later, permanent measures replacing them are underlined by a broader vision, according to which enhanced integration would facilitate financial stability. In this spirit, the FCT provides for stricter convergence criteria, the 'Six Pack' regulation provides for stronger surveillance and enforcement mechanisms with regard to these criteria, whereas the 'Two Pack' regulation subjects draft national budgets to surveillance by the EU Commission, prior to national parliaments' voting.
Simultaneously, efforts were made to strengthen supervision and discipline of the EMU banking sector, which is particularly sensitive to financial crises, where uncertainty meets liquidity shortage. 34 Due to this sensitivity, banks played a decisive role in the American sub-prime financial crisis and in the EU/ EMU financial crisis it triggered. the supervisory authorities in the member states and a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) responsible for macro-prudential supervision of the EU financial system as a whole, including non-bank sectors and cross-sectoral concerns, they form the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS). 35 All aim at tightening up the discipline on financial services in EU markets, supervising them at EU level. In performing its supervisory function, the ECB now closely cooperates with these authorities.
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In 2013, a Single Rule Book was initiated for all 28 EU member states, aiming at preventing future bank crises; ensuring improved depositor protection by ensuring guarantee for deposits of up to € 100,000; and determining rules for managing failing banks. Its purpose is to decrease the scope of national discretion, to prevent maneuvering during national transposition.
A Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) became operational in 2014. The SSM marks a higher degree of market integration than its predecessor. For SSM members it implies far reaching interference of EU/EMU authorities, headed by the ECB, in the national decision making process, and broad delegation of powers from national to supranational authorities, compared to the previous arrangement that implied only coordination and cooperation between national authorities.
A complementary Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) was established, consisting of a Single Resolution Board (SRB) and a fund (SRF) amounting to € 55 billion within eight years, to be financed by the banks in the Banking Union countries. It aims at facilitating the treatment of banks in difficulties. Deposit guarantee at the EMU, the third pillar of financial stabilization envisioned by the Five Presidents Report, is administered by national deposit guarantee schemes. By 2019 the Commission is to review the current arrangement, to see whether a single, pan European, Deposit Guarantee Scheme (EDIS) should be set up.
Did the Democratic Nature of the Decision Making Process Improve Over Time?
Critics pointed out non-democratic elements in the decision-making processes leading to the regulation described above. were studied and implemented in certain later decision making processes, but not in all of them.
Re EU institutions:
-Towards formal meritocracy and substantial tyranny of executive institutions?
More than twenty years ago, Grimm 37 warned that the EU's supranational decision making process would become increasingly independent of nationally organized opinion and will-formation processes.
The context of the financial crisis presented some examples for the growing power and independence of EU institutions. Critiques argued 38 that monetary policies of the European Central Bank (ECB) are completely immunized against political intervention, and that the Commission and standard setting agencies acting as regulators obtain a high level of political independence.
Furthermore, commentators claimed 39 that the evolving EU system of executive federalism' produces increasing imbalances in the relationship between the member states, which were reflected in the Euro crisis, and might only be solved by further revision of EU Treaties.
This reality seems to persist, even after the height of the crisis has passed.
-EU intervention in national priorities and affairs gradually grows
This criticism was invoked at all stages of the crisis. At the beginning of the crisis, high level of EU intervention in national economies was justified on grounds of emergency. National supreme and constitutional courts approached in different member states, asked whether such intervention would not undermine national sovereignty answered negatively, thus justifying EU intervention to recover the crisis. The Two Pack' legislation, providing for pre-examination of national draft budgets by the EU Commission, to ensure economic stability at the EU/EMU area, was criticized on these grounds. 41 The EU Commission argued that it would only focus on ensuring economic stability, without interfering in national priorities, albeit it is clear that any such intervention would have implications on such priorities. It further noted that its intervention does not imply compulsory directions. Nevertheless, it is clear that under the circumstances, ignoring Commission recommendations would not be advisable, although in this case, unlike in the case of country-specific recommendations resulting from EU Commission's surveillance regarding the macroeconomic imbalance procedure in the European Semester, aimed at coordination of macroeconomic policies (as part of the Six Pack' regulation), no clear link was drawn between recommendations implementation and entitlement of the member state at stake to EU funds. 42 The SSM implies a high level of intervention by the ECB -the supreme banking supervisor -in national affairs, to ensure the stability of national financial institutions. Recently, a member of ECB's executive board and vice-chair of the ECB's Supervisory Board suggested considering, in cases where a member state does not apply national legislation assimilating EU law into the national legal system, to render the ECB directly competent to apply such national legislation. 43 This is an even farther-reaching perception of intervention in national affairs, unprecedented at EU/EMU context. Being suggested by a senior ECB official, it may serve as an evidence to the spirit of future prospects foreseen by this institution.
All in all, it seems that EU intervention at the national level is, indeed, gradually growing, and the Five Presidents Report suggests expanding it even further, as an inevitable consequence of envisioned higher degrees of market integralawjournal.org/pdfs/Vol14-No1/PDF_Vol_14_No_1_75-112_ESM%20Special_Vranes. pdf ; WINNING, Nicolas, DENDRINOU, Victoria. Supra, note 7. 41 SCHMIDT, Vivien. The Forgotten Problem of Democratic Legitimacy: "Governing by the Rules" and "Ruling by the Numbers". In: MATTHIJS, M Matthias, BLYTH, Mark (eds). 44 Evaluating the meaning of this fact depends on one's perception of the desired level of markets' integration.
Theoretically, globalization does not necessarily undermine national democracy. In certain cases, it may even enhance it. 45 Unfortunately, this is not always the case. Rodrik's globalization trilemma suggests that out of three aims: national sovereignty, democratic politics and hyper-globalization (namely: enhanced stage of market integration), always, two can thrive at the cost of giving up the third one. 46 According to this trilemma, in EU/EMU context, some would opt for keeping the globalized structure of the EU and striving towards further democratizing it (at the cost of compromising national sovereignty), 47 while others, maybe out of disappointment of EU's functioning hitherto, including its functioning with regard to the financial crisis, would rather prefer to strengthen national sovereignty and democracy at the cost of giving up further globalization, or integration.
-The European Parliament (EP), which is considered to represent EU people(s) more than any other EU institution, is not sufficiently involved in the decisionmaking process
This criticism was particularly strong regarding the emergency measures taken when the financial crisis burst. 49 It was seriously taken into consideration in later stages. Thus, for example, the EP President signed the Five Presidents Report while being excluded from the previous, Four Presidents Report. 50 The Five Presidents Report explicitly addresses the importance of enhanced participation of the EP in the decision-making process. 51 As a result of strong political pressure, SSM regulation provides for full accountability of decision makers to the EP.
On this issue, thus, some improvement of the democratic process occurred over time. Nevertheless, both the Five Presidents Report and the explanatory notes to SSM regulation admit that there is still room -and necessity -for further enhancing EP's involvement in these processes.
To complement the picture, it should be noted, though, that the perception of the EP as best representing the interests of EU citizens is not clean of doubts. Common arguments suggest, among other things, that the rate of voting to EP members in many EU member states is relatively low; that many times, candidates are nationally elected as MEPs based on a national agenda, which is irrelevant to their functioning in the EP; and that in the EP, MEPs function and vote according to the agenda associated with their political affiliation at EU, rather than national, sphere.
Re the member states: -Economic elites strive to regain autocracy? The economically strong countries, or contributors', dictate decisions. Other voices are heard, but ignored
The legal theory of finance 52 depicts finance as a hierarchical system, dominated by financially strong countries (and players within these countries) which, in times of crisis, when elasticity and discretion in the application of law are necessary to regain stability, direct the decision-making process in favor of their interests.
In EU context, right from the start of the crisis it was broadly argued that the contributing countries -headed by Germany -led the decision-making process, directing it towards solutions that best served their interests. This argument was invoked regarding decision making processes taken mainly, but not only, by the European Council (EU leaders) and the Council of the EU (ministers of the member states). It refers, among other things, to the definition of the crisis as a ‚debt crisis' rather than a financial imbalances crisis; 53 the demand that the assisted countries adopt austerity measures, 54 leading to wage compression and the Council, the Five Presidents Report was written by the President of the Commission (an executive authority considered the least 'democratic' authority among EU institutions a drive for exports; the standards applied by the ECB 55 and the strong discipline assisted countries were required to meet as pre-condition for financial assistance; the avoidance of adjustments in all EU countries, to close gaps in fields such as prices and lending policies; the establishment of the SSM, and its essence. 56 It seems that hitherto, the contributing countries did not give up their dominance of the decision-making process regarding the financial crisis. Other EU/ EMU member states feel that despite their alleged political equality -e.g. in terms of voting rights -in essence their ability to affect the process is marginal and the solutions chosen do not duly serve their interests. This may well be a case where ‚the fact that an international rule is negotiated and accepted by a democratically elected government does not inherently make that rule democratically legitimate'. 57 This gap exacerbates long standing problems with regard to EU's democratic legitimacy and solidarity, turning the financial crisis into a political crisis.
-EU, non-EMU member states have less access to the decision-making process, although it affects their interests
To the extent that the financial crisis is addressed as a Euro-crisis, decision making takes place in EMU institutions in which EU, non-EMU member states have no voting rights. This group of countries, which is nevertheless affected by decisions so taken, due to the high level of market integration among EU members, can only affect the decisions taken by consultation. This situation exists with regard to financial assistance by the ESM (to which EU, non-EMU countries are not entitled if they encounter financial difficulties) as well as to the decision-making process in the ECB, regarding the SSM (due to legal constraints dictated by Art. 127(6) TFEU, chosen as the legal basis for this mechanism in order to avoid Treaty changes). This exclusion applies even to EU, non-EMU member states choosing to act in ‚close cooperation', namely to apply the SSM voluntarily, thus bearing the same obligations as EMU member states regarding the SSM. This exclusion is undoubtedly a source of great frustration for EU, non-EMU countries. Both the Five Presidents Report (anticipating that all of them finally join the EMU) and the SSM explanatory notes recognize the necessity to change this situation. Nevertheless, obtainment of this goal necessitates a long (and maybe currently politically unfeasible) process of Treaties modification.
EU, non-EMU member states are represented in EBA. However, despite the change of voting formula in EBA regarding standards, in other contexts SSM Members may coordinate their voting, making it very difficult for non-SSM Members to oppose their positions. 
Re the European people(s) -National parliaments are hardly involved in the decision-making process
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By and large, the involvement of EU members' national parliaments in EU decision making processes is rather limited. This reality seems to change gradually, as EU leaders realize the adverse effects of the growing ‚democratic deficit' frustration among EU citizens. Thus, the Five Presidents Report explicitly calls for enhanced involvement of the national parliaments, asking EU Commission to work out the details.
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The SSM takes one step further, providing that in certain matters, decision makers at EU level (e.g. the ECB and its Supervisory Board) would be accountable to the national parliaments.
In this sense the democratic process has thus allegedly improved, but the details and full implementation are still to be worked out, to ensure not only formal, but effective national parliaments involvement.
-Direct involvement of EU people(s) is marginal
This argument provides that the structure of EU decision making processes does scarcely allow for direct citizens' involvement. Rare opportunities for such direct involvement occur, 62 for example, in cases of national referenda (e.g. to nationally ratify an EU Treaty). Such referenda do not take place often, due to the high administrative and financial burden they bear as well as due to political concerns about their unpredictable results.
Deliberate avoidance from Treaty amendments is explicitly declared by the Five Presidents Report, justified in terms of efficiency and emergency. However, the report explicitly admits, with regard to decisions taken at the height of the crisis, that ‚[i]n several cases, intergovernmental solutions were chosen to… overcome opposition', 63 probably referring to the ESMT and the FCT, concluded as public international law treaties rather than as new EU Treaties or amendments to existing EU Treaties.
Allegedly, existing EU Treaties already represent the will of EU citizens, rendering constant amendments unnecessary. Furthermore, the results of the 2015 Greek elections and the Brexit referendum reflect the shortcomings of this form of direct democracy.
At the same time, avoiding necessary Treaty modifications despite substantial change of circumstances, thus compromising regulation quality (as in the case of non-EMU member states voting exclusion), may be suspected as an attempt to prevent the undermining of measures enhancing integration, desired by EU institutions, by negative national referenda votes.
Due to its technical nature, the SSM suggests only limited opportunities for direct EU/EMU citizens' intervention, confined to initiating certain judicial or semi-judicial procedures this mechanism allows (e.g. approaching the joint Board of Appeal of the European Supervisory Authorities, regarding EBA).
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These possibilities mark an advancement compared to the lack of semi-judicial, and existence of limited judicial options with regard to the earlier ESM.
Did the Democratic Nature of the Measures Taken Improve Over Time?
In all decision-making processes that took place regarding the financial crisis treatment, decision makers were aware of the necessity for democratic legitimacy of regulation and the decision making processes leading to it. While it seems to be attributed a lesser weight at the emergency stage, in later stages serious efforts were made to establish a system that balances the different interests involved. Nevertheless, there is still a great room for improvement. fied in Article 5(6) ESMT), to qualified majority (80% of the votes cast, in circumstances specified in Article 5(7) ESMT), or to simple majority in all other cases. However, "[i]n respect of all decisions, a quorum of 2/3 of the members with voting rights representing at least 2/3 of the voting rights must be present. " (Article 4(2) ESMT). This provision ensures that a minority of Members would not enforce any decision.
The voting formulas in the SSM differ for each body, and may be much more elaborated. Their detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this article. The varied formulas mark an effort to fine-tune this system as much as possible, devising a different decision making mechanism for each institution, according to its specificities. Two rules are shared by all these formulas: one vote per one member, and decision by majority. In cases involving non-SSM EU member states with voting rights, majority definition necessitates their voting.
Material equality
In both the ESM and the SSM, material equality is obtained by taking into account the special circumstances of each Member State for any relevant decision on it.
Decision review
The ESM consists of three layers of decision making: a Board of Governors, consisting of finance ministers of the member states, a Board of Directors, consisting of professionals, and a Managing Director, with an inherent review mechanism. There is no external specific review mechanism for its final decisions, beyond the general EU mechanisms (e.g. CJEU, which in the case of the ESMT seems to have limited powers).
The SSM includes a broad network of review mechanisms, including selfreview, review by executive authorities, review by semi-judicial and by judicial forums. These forums allow for broader participation in the decision-making, facilitating lesson-learning processes. 
Obligatory recovery
The lack of ESM procedure to force a process of recovery on a member state that does not request for assistance, although its vulnerable financial situation might risk the other partners, was criticized. 70 The SSM (which may be perceived mainly as a preventive mechanism, although it may recommend financial assistance in cases of crisis) is obligatory 69 for all EMU members. It is optional only for EU, non-EMU members (none of which decided to join it yet).
This choice seems to mark a preference of EMU member states' general benefit on the account of national sovereign discretion, emanating from the lesson learned through the crisis.
Sanctions
The following sanctions, potentially imposed by EU regulation on member states in crisis (justified on grounds of deterrence) were criticized for being counter-productive, potentially contributing to further escalation in the situation of these countries:
A member failing to respect its obligations in relation to paid-in shares or calls of capital, or in relation to the reimbursement of the financial assistance, may lose its voting rights (Article 4(8) ESMT), thus losing its ability to affect the decision-making process which might affect it directly.
Severe fines may be imposed, according to the ‚Six Pack' mechanism, that would put an extra burden on economies already in severe difficulties.
Heavy fines are imposed by the SSM on member states breaching the financial discipline standards it dictates. Nevertheless, possibly following the criticism on these former provisions, SSM regulation obliges the ECB to ensure the fines are effective, proportionate and dissuasive'. 71 These conditions may serve as legal protection, and grounds for a harmed country to challenge controversial ECB decisions at the CJEU.
Fields Where Further Improvement of the Democratic Nature of the Measures Taken is Necessary
These aspects are specified in addition to the aspects still necessitating improvement, mentioned before: Nevertheless, in some of the SSM forums, (e.g. such as the ECB's Administrative Board of Review, the Mediation Panel, the Steering Committee, EBA's Management Board, the Joint Committee of Supervisory Authorities, the Joint Board of Appeal) there is no direct representation of all EMU member states at all times. This practice is justified in terms of efficiency. Decision makers in these authorities are obliged to be impartial and committed to the best interests of the Union. However, this approach substantially differs from the one characterizing most EU institutions.
Representation
Voting and equality
All ESM and SSM voting models rely on majority voting, where each member state has one vote. Some believe that replacement of this system with a system reflecting financial market size would be more democratic.
It has also been argued that where SSM legislation requires a double majority voting -of SSM and non-SSM Members -the latter may be given powers to block rule-making which is relevant for the entire Union. 
Broad discretion
The broad discretion of the ESM Board of Governors to decide how to assist a country that asks for it was criticized for lack of criteria, or set of goals limiting it, and for lack of accountability standards similar to those applying to EU agencies. The only way for a Member State to challenge such a decision is thus to refer the dispute to the CJEU.
By and large, the same criticism applies to the SSM, where the ECB enjoys very broad discretion.
Too high standards
The ESM may impose on a member state suffering a financial crisis standards that may be too high for it to meet, thus being counter-productive.
SSM standards that may impose a too high threshold for small banks, particularly in economically weak countries. If small banks would not survive this arrangement, market competitiveness may be undermined, leaving only the strong, large banks in the game. Consumers may bear the price.
ECB's status
In the ESMT context, critiques mentioned the lack of mechanisms for restraining the ECB by governments. Due to the SSM, the ECB now fulfills two functions, acting both as the liquidity supplier, in charge of monetary policy, and as supreme supervisor, thus enjoying substantive power of decision, bearing distributive implications for the economies of the member states. This fact empowers the ECB even beyond its former status, reinforcing this criticism. Moreover, despite formal denial, 74 in certain cases these two functions may bear conflicts of interests. 75 
Transparency
EU authorities are subject to general rules on due process and transparency. Nevertheless, in the context of the ESMT and SSM commentators suggested that the general public accountability could have improved by assuming specific, extended transparency obligations on the institutions involved. 
Conclusion
Comparison of major elements in the structure and functioning of the ESM, enacted as an emergency instrument, and the SSM, enacted after the peak of the financial crisis seems to have subsided, reflects that despite some improvements in the ‚democratic' nature of the latter, compared to the former, both still share many non-democratic elements.
Already back in 1997 Scharpf
77 foresaw a potential conflict of interests between the strive for economic integration at EU level on the one hand, and national economic interests which do not correlate to it, on the other hand. He further noted that while the process of European integration imposes growing challenges on the economies of EU member states, it drastically and unnecessarily reduces the effectiveness of democratic self-determination at the national level, while at the higher, European level where action might be effective, demo-cratic legitimacy is weaker or non-existent. Realizing the potential threat created by the combination of these two facts, he stressed the need to defend and protect the national regimes of social market economies against the legal compulsions of negative integration.' 78 At this time of crisis, the EU/EMU seems to be caught between EU institutions' pressure on decision makers to enhance market integration, and a growing political pressure by EU/EMU citizens to gain access to this decision-making process. While public's pressure for enhancing the democratic nature of the measures devised to pull out of the financial crisis seems to have borne some fruit by now, examination of recent regulation reflects that there is still a long way to go.
The Brexit may serve as a red light signaling that in the current unstable political atmosphere it might be better to stop, or slow down, the enhanced integration process for re-evaluation and start an intensified, open dialogue with EU citizens, further facilitating their involvement, or at least the involvement of their directly elected representatives: the EP and national parliaments, in the decision-making processes, to strengthen the sense of democratic legitimacy and the democratic characteristics of the mechanisms established. National sovereigns' effect on the process may be strengthened, for example, by enhancing mediation exercised by states' democratic systems between EU rules and peoples-ascitizens'. 79 Such mediation may reduce the sense of remoteness underlying the democratic deficit' feeling of EU citizens.
Otherwise, the seeds of non-satisfaction may continue to grow, further risking the EU/EMU alliance.
78 SCHARPF, Fritz. Supra, note 38. 79 NICOLAIDES, Kalypso. Supra, note 14, p. 355.
